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GUANTÁNAMO, HABEAS CORPUS, AND STANDARDS OF PROOF:
VIEWING THE LAW THROUGH MULTIPLE LENSES
Matthew C. Waxman *
The Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantánamo detainees
have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their detention, but it
left to district courts in the first instance responsibility for working through
the appropriate standard of proof and related evidentiary principles imposed on the government to justify continued detention. This article argues
that embedded in seemingly straightforward judicial standard-setting with
respect to proof and evidence are significant policy questions about competing risks and their distribution. How one approaches these questions depends on the lens through which one views the problem: through that of a
courtroom concerned with evidence or through that of a battlefield clouded
by imperfect intelligence. All three branches of government should play
significant roles in answering these questions, which are critical to establishing sound detention policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantánamo
detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their detention. 1 However, the Court left to district courts in the first instance responsibility for working through the many procedural and substantive issues that
would govern resulting habeas proceedings. 2 While mandating that Guantánamo detainees receive access to U.S. federal courts empowered to correct
errors after “meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain,” 3 the Court emphasized that it was “not ad*

Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign
Relations; Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. I
thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and guidance: Robert Chesney,
Philip Hamburger, Dan Richman, and Benjamin Wittes. I also thank Neta Levanon for her
excellent research assistance.
1
See 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
2
See Del Quentin Wilber, Detention Challenges Are Far Off for Many, WASH. POST, July
31, 2009, at A06, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
07/30/AR2009073004116.html. See also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1163 (2009) (“To say that the
Suspension clause affirmatively guarantees a right to habeas corpus leaves open a welter of
issues about the scope of that right.”).
3
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).

245

246

CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 42:245

dress[ing] the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.” 4 The
particular questions I focus on here—questions with procedural and substantive, domestic and international law dimensions—concern the standard
of proof and related evidentiary principles imposed by habeas courts on the
government to justify continued detention.
In a 2008 article I compared detention decision-making to military
targeting decision-making and argued that international law rules governing
targeting could be imported by analogy to help derive answers to the question: If a state is engaged in armed conflict with a transnational terrorist
organization, and the state decides to detain or continue detaining someone
fighting on the enemy’s behalf, how certain ought the state have to be in its
assessment of that individual’s identity and enemy status? 5 This Article
examines how district courts have so far dealt with this issue.
This article argues that embedded in seemingly straightforward
judicial standard-setting with respect to proof and evidence are significant
policy questions about competing risks and their distribution. How one approaches these questions depends on the lens through which one views the
problem: through that of a courtroom concerned with evidence or through
that of a battlefield clouded by imperfect intelligence. The article concludes
that all three branches of government should play significant roles in working through these questions, which are critical to establishing sound policy
not only for those currently detained at Guantánamo, but also for those likely to be captured in the future struggle against al-Qaida.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF ISSUES
One question that quickly arises in habeas proceedings reviewing
enemy combatant detentions is the appropriate standard of proof: to what
level of certainty must the government prove the factual bases of its detention decision? For all enemy combatant detentions until Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 6
and Boumediene, 7 and since then for detentions of al-Qaida and allied fighters pursuant to war powers outside the U.S. or Guantánamo, the executive
has dealt with this issue unilaterally and internally—i.e., through its own
judgments of legally necessary factual certainty about a suspect’s identity
and conduct to warrant and authorize detention. Once habeas rights or some
other form of judicial review apply, however, courts must quickly confront
this issue more formally and explicitly. The courts’ assessments of the government’s claims about particular suspects must be measured against some
4

Id. at 2277.
See Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008).
6
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
7
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
5
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standard, whether it be a low one such as the “some evidence” standard or a
high one like “clear and convincing” or “beyond reasonable doubt.” 8
At the time of this writing, all district courts to consider Guantánamo habeas cases have reached or adopted the same answer: that courts
should apply the “preponderance of evidence” standard—i.e., more probable than not—in assessing whether an individual is properly detained under
the executive’s detention power, 9 however that power is defined. 10 There
was initially some dispute over this issue in the many consolidated cases
before Judge Hogan. 11 Detainees’ counsel urged the court to use a “clear
and convincing” standard, 12 the standard the Supreme Court has held to
apply in some other contexts where the government seeks to impose substantial deprivation of liberty. 13 The government urged instead that it ought
only have to put forth credible evidence that the petitioner meets the proper
detention criteria, after which the burden should shift to petitioner to rebut it
with more persuasive evidence. 14 Ultimately, the government urged a preponderance of evidence standard, distinguishing the cases cited by petition-

8

The “beyond reasonable doubt” standard for criminal conviction, held to be constitutionally required in In re Wiship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), reflects one possible balance of competing harms with respect to criminal suspects. As Blackstone explained, “it is better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *358 (1853). The question here is to what extent the threat of terrorism requires recalibrating that balance.
9
See, e.g., Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2009); Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2009); Sliti v. Bush, 592 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 (D.D.C.
2008); El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 146 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Alwi v. Bush, 593 F.
Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2008); Hammamy v. Obama, 604 F. Supp. 2d 240, 242 (D.D.C.
2009); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 35 n.12 (D.D.C. 2009); Al Ginco v. Obama,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53932, at 6–7 (D.D.C. 2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d
191, 195–96 (D.D.C. 2008); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Al Mutairi
v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at *1 (D.D.C. July 29,
2009).
10
On the difficult legal and policy issues of defining detention authority in the context of
terrorism, see generally Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why
Detain, and Detain Whom? 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1 (2009).
11
See Petitioner’s Joint Memorandum of Law Addressing Procedural Framework Issues at
11–13, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. July 25,
2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-dcdce/case_no-1:2008mc00442/
case_id-131990/ [hereinafter Procedural Framework Memorandum].
12
Id. at 11–13.
13
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (discussing the civil commitment of sex offenders); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (discussing the continued commitment of criminal suspects found not guilty by reason of insanity); United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (discussing pre-trial detention based on alleged
dangerousness).
14
See Procedural Framework Memorandum, supra note 11, at 15.
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ers as irrelevant in the wartime context. 15 The district court sided with the
government, 16 and since then other district court judges have uniformly—
and without analysis—applied the same standard in Guantánamo habeas
cases. Courts probably gravitated toward the preponderance standard for
these cases in part because preponderance of evidence is typically the standard presumptively applied in most habeas contexts. 17
Should preponderance of evidence be the proof standard in these
cases? The dearth of judicial analysis of this question at any level is surprising given how often the outcome of these cases will centrally turn on this
question. 18 After all, the fundamental problem out of which these cases
grow is a conflict against a transnational terrorist organization that does not
openly mark its members and supporters as such, but instead tries to obfuscate their identity. 19 Almost every seriously contested case will involve a
dispute about the strength of the government’s information supporting its
assessment. And in those cases for which habeas review will make a meaningful difference between release or continued detention, the government’s
case will likely include judgments made in the murky fog of war, reliance
on intelligence supplied by foreign governments, or assessments developed
based on patterns of suspects’ behavior in relation to what is known about
the enemy. 20

15
See Government’s Response to Petitioner’s Filing on Framework Procedural Issues at
8–11, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Aug. 1,
2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-dcdce/case_no-1:2008mc00442/
case_id-131990/.
16
See Case Management Order at 4, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc.
No. 08-0442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/
court-dcdce/case_no-1:2008mc00442/case_id-131990/.
17
See 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 1497 (2001) (explaining that because habeas proceedings are generally considered civil in nature, the presumptive standard of proof is preponderance of evidence).
18
For a thorough scholarly examination of this issue from the perspective of domestic
habeas law, concluding that preponderance standard is an acceptable approach in this context, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV 2032, 2092–93 (2007).
19
The Israeli Supreme Court recently made this point in upholding Israel’s Internment of
Unlawful Combatants Law. See CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel [2008], at 20
(Isr.), translation available at http://elyon2.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.
n04.pdf (“[U]nlawful combatants do not as a rule carry any clear and unambiguous indication that they belong to a terrorist organization.” (citation omitted)).
20
Many of the cases considered by Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo
involved plausible denials or silence on the detainee pitted against plausible inferences drawn
from intelligence sources. See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 72–99 (2008). See also Al Odah v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2730489, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2009) (stating that “the
Court finds that the Government has met its burden based on the evidence in the record with-
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Consider, for example, two cases that appear to fall close to but ultimately settle on different sides of the preponderance line. In Al Mutairi v.
United States, the district court implied that the government narrowly failed
to justify detention of a Kuwaiti national alleged to have joined al-Qaida
and an affiliated terrorist group. Although the government established that
the petitioner’s activities and travel closely matched patterns of al-Qaida
agents, the court went on to find that:
[T]he Government has at best shown that some of Al Mutairi’s conduct
was consistent with persons who may have become a part of al Qaida or an
associated force of al Qaida, but there is nothing in the record beyond
speculation that Al Mutairi did, in fact, train with or otherwise become a
part of either or both of those organizations. While Al Mutairi’s described
travels within Afghanistan lack credibility, the Government has not supplanted Al Mutairi’s version of his travels with sufficiently credible and
reliable evidence to meet its burden of persuasion by a preponderance of
the evidence. 21

In Boumediene v. Bush, on remand, the district court ordered the
government to release five of six native Algerians taken by the U.S. government in Bosnia. 22 As to the sixth, however, the court held that:
[T]he Government has met its burden by providing additional evidence
that sufficiently corroborates its allegations from [an] unnamed source that
Bensayah is an al-Qaida facilitator. . . . In order to establish Bensayah’s
role as an al-Qaida facilitator, the Government depends on the same intelligence information described above [and found to be unpersuasive with
respect to the other five], but also puts forth a series of other intelligence
reports based on a variety of sources and evidence . . . . 23

Not only do this sixth case in Boumediene and Al Mutairi appear to
fall close to the preponderance line, but the courts’ descriptions also highlight how easily different judges viewing the same evidence could reach
different conclusions, either because they weigh certain pieces of evidence
differently or because they view the standard differently. 24 It is easy to
out specifically identifying that the Taliban-run camp attended by Al Odah was, in fact, Al
Farouq. ”).
21
Al Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at *1
(D.D.C. July 29, 2009).
22
Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197–98 (D.D.C. 2008).
23
Id. at 198.
24
See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293 (1982) (documenting ambiguity and
different interpretations of proof burdens among judges). For another example in the Guantánamo context, consider Awad v. Obama, Civil Action No. 05-CV-2379 (D.D.C. Aug. 12,
2009), available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv2379-178.
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wonder after reading these two decisions in full whether any principled line
drawing distinguishes them.
One way of looking at the standard of proof question is through the
lens of domestic law. Viewing the issue as one of procedural due process
and applying the Mathews v. Eldridge 25 balancing test, the Supreme Court
in Hamdi made clear with respect to citizen-detainees that risk of erroneous
detention is the key individual interest to be protected. 26 The Mathews balancing test assesses the sufficiency of procedural protections based on the
importance of the individual interest at stake, the state’s interests, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the individual’s interests, and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. 27 So considering these factors in the
context of detaining al-Qaida suspects, how much risk of error is appropriate? Neither Hamdi—which, in the case of a citizen-detainee, called for a
“fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker” 28—nor the Supreme Court’s extension of Hamdi’s principles in Boumediene—requiring a “meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
that [a detainee] is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law” 29—answer that question. True, Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi rejects both the government’s suggestion that it need only show a court “some evidence” to back up its decisions—the lowest proof standard used by courts—as well as the Petitioner’s
suggestion that criminal trial standards are required. 30 But that still leaves a
lot of room in between. 31
In that case, Judge Robertson acknowledged that “the case against Awad is gossamer thin.”
Id. at slip op. 20. He goes on to say that “[t]he evidence is of a kind fit only for these unique
proceedings [REDACTED]” but in the end, it seems “more likely than not that Awad was,
for some period of time, ‘part of’ al Qaida” and the correlation of names on the list “clearly
tied to al Qaida make it more likely than not that he knew the al Qaida fighters at the hospital
and joined them in the barricade.” Id. at slip op. 20–21.
25
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
26
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532–33 (2003).
27
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
28
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. See also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2091 (“Although
we . . . approve of the plurality’s basic approach in Hamdi, its opinion is regrettably unclear
on crucial points, including the burden of persuasion that the government must meet to
justify detaining an American citizen as an enemy combatant.”).
29
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2238 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 302 (2001)).
30
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537–39. Justice O’Connor may have hinted also at the appropriateness of the preponderance standard when she said that “once the Government puts forth
credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus
could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls
outside the criteria.” Id. at 534.
31
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271 (“[t]he extent of the showing required of the government in these cases is a matter to be determined.”); see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas

2009] GUANTÁNAMO, HABEAS, AND PROOF STANDARDS

251

One of the most interesting applications of the minimal Hamdi
guidance as to the standard of proof issue appears in the district court’s consideration of Boumediene v. Bush on remand. 32 In rejecting the government’s claims that petitioner fell within the executive’s detention authority,
the court explained:
[W]hile the information in the classified intelligence report, relating to the
credibility and reliability of the source, was undoubtedly sufficient for the
intelligence purposes for which it was prepared, it is not sufficient for the
purposes for which a habeas court must now evaluate it. To allow enemy
combatancy to rest on so thin a reed would be inconsistent with this
Court’s obligation under the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi to protect
petitioners from the risk of erroneous detention. 33

It is not so clear, however, how thick or thin a reed Hamdi requires.
Procedural due process doctrine is not about preventing all errors, but rather
reducing their likelihood to a legally appropriate probability. Standing
alone, the holdings of Hamdi and Boumediene offer little guidance on what
level of error is appropriate. This lack of guidance exists because setting
that standard depends critically on a balance of risks and a notion of how
these risks should be shared or distributed, issues that so far courts have
been cautious to tackle. 34 As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship:
Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these
two types of erroneous outcomes [false positives and false negatives], the
choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social
disutility of each. 35

Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 58
(2008) (“Habeas courts will face a complex of questions falling under the general heading of
‘scope of review’” including “the deference (if any) that they should give to various determinations by CSRTs . . . .”).
32
579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008).
33
Id. at 197 (emphasis in original).
34
The Fourth Circuit struggled with this issue in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213,
274 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), vacated by,
remanded by, application granted by Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (Traxler,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“In the words of Matthews, [the proposed proof standards
and burdens] would sufficiently address the ‘risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of a detainee’s
liberty interest while eliminating certain procedures that have question additional value in
light of the burden on the [g]overnment.”) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534
(2003)).
35
397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Dale A. Nance, Evidential
Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 622 (1998) (“The now conventional understanding of the burden of proof is that the level or weight of the burden of
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As alluded to earlier, 36 in other contexts involving substantial deprivation of liberty, courts have required the government to justify its case
by clear and convincing evidence. In Addington v. Texas, for example, the
Supreme Court held that the clear and convincing standard is constitutionally required in civil commitment hearings. 37 In doing so the Court explained
that “[t]he standard [of proof] serves to allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” 38 In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld pretrial
detention under the federal Bail Reform Act relying heavily on its view that
the Act’s requirement of “clear and convincing evidence that no conditions
of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person”
struck an appropriate balance liberty-security balance. 39
In the Guantánamo context, however, setting proof standards is especially difficult because the factors to be balanced are so weighty in multiple directions—they include, among many other considerations, the harm
of erroneous detention under severe conditions, perhaps indefinitely, versus
the risk of letting a dangerous terrorist go free. 40 Both of these are arguably
persuasion is determined by the expected utilities associated with correct and incorrect alternative decisions.”).
36
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
37
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
38
Id. at 423.
39
481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). See also Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) (explaining that the clear and convincing standard applicable in Salerno was critical to that holding).
40
Judge Posner poses this question but does not provide a specific answer:
Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases causes many guilty
defendants to be acquitted and many other guilty persons not to be charged in the
first place. We accept this as a price worth paying to protect the innocent. But ordinary crime does not imperil national security; modern terrorism does, so the government’s burden of proof should be lighter, though how much lighter is a matter
of judgment.
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 64–65 (2006). This point arose in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in
which the Court made clear that indefinite administrative detention of a removable alien
would raise constitutional due process concerns, but also noted that a statutory scheme directed at suspected terrorists might change its analysis in light of heightened security stakes.
See id. at 691.
It is important to note, however, that the threat level among detainees at Guantánamo and
elsewhere varies significantly, and there is considerable debate about “recidivism” rates
among those released from Guantánamo. Compare U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FACT
SHEET, FORMER GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TERRORISM TRENDS (Apr. 7, 2009), available at
www.defenselink.mil/news/returntothefightfactsheet2.pdf (reporting fourteen percent of
former Guantánamo detainees likely reengaged in terrorist activities) (last visited Oct. 31,
2009), with Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Commentary: How Many Gitmo Prisoners Return to Fight?, CNN, July 21, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/20/

2009] GUANTÁNAMO, HABEAS, AND PROOF STANDARDS

253

greater dangers than those considered in most civil or criminal detention
contexts. 41 And for that matter, how one views the liberty harms depends on
whether one begins from a baseline of peacetime, where individual liberty is
the strongly protected interest, or wartime, where liberty deprivations are
more widely shared and procedural protections are often curtailed, or some
baseline in between.
Viewed through the lens of the international law of war the same
questions arise but by a different analytic route. The Obama administration
has taken the position in ongoing habeas litigation that its detention authority pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force should
be interpreted by reference to the international law of armed conflict, 42 and
courts have generally agreed with that approach. If courts are looking to
international law to discern the substantive bounds of executive detention
power in this context, should they not also look to those same sources of
law to discern the standard of proof? 43 If habeas is an error correction mechanism, and the Supreme Court made clear in Boumediene that habeas is a
flexible tool to be adapted to particular contexts, then its standards should
be informed by the substantive law whose bounds it is policing.
On the face of their opinions, the habeas courts are not looking to
the law of war for guidance on the proof standard issue, likely seeing it as a
procedural question rather than a substantive one. Even if courts did, however, the law of war does not provide clear guidance.
International law of detention in warfare contains little definitive
guidance on the standard of proof or certainty issue probably for two overarching reasons. First, in the limited-duration, conventional warfare between
professional armies out of which the modern law developed, the issue of
detention review standards rarely needed such precise guidance. Second, the
appropriate standard of proof or certainty in warfare is very contextdependent. 44 Article 5 of the the Third Geneva Convention, for example,
requires that:
bergen.guantanamo/index.html (disputing Defense Department figures) (last visited on Oct.
31, 2009).
41
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91, 696 (2001) (stating that due process
analysis with respect to immigration detention might be different if it involved suspected
terrorists or special national security needs).
42
See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation,
Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf .
43
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of revieing the legality of Executive detention . . . .”). On the
law of war and detention authorities, see generally Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2009).
44
See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1379–84.
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Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of
[the combatant categories established by the Geneva Conventions], such
persons shall enjoy the protections of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 45

But Article 5 says nothing about what level of certainty a “competent tribunal” should apply in resolving any doubt. 46
Longstanding U.S. military regulations based on Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention call for battlefield review of questionable detentions by a panel of officers applying a preponderance of evidence standard, 47 and in her plurality opinion in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor pointed
favorably toward these standards as a model that might satisfy due
process. 48 But it is not clear from these military regulations whether the
U.S. military regards the preponderance standard as legally compelled or
prudentially warranted, nor whether it would regard a higher standard as
legally appropriate in some contexts. Looking abroad, there is very little
clear state practice on this question from which to measure opinio juris. 49
As an alternative approach to filling this gap, I previously argued
that the principles of targeting law in warfare could be extrapolated to provide guidance on the standard of proof or certainty issue with respect to
non-criminal terrorist detention. The “reasonable care” requirement with
respect to verifying the targets of lethal force amid factual uncertainty could
be adapted to the detention context. I argued, based on general law of war
principles, that the appropriate standard of certainty required to justify detention at any point in time depended on a balance between military necessity or security concerns and humanitarian or liberty interests, and should take
45
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950).
46
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed recommended
procedural guidelines that should apply in such cases. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED
CONFLICTS at Annex 1 (2007), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
html/ihl-30-international-conference-101207. See also Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles
and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 375 (2005).
47
See U.S. ARMY, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES
AND OTHER DETAINEES, AR 190-8, at § 1-6(9) (1997), available at http://www.au.af.mil/
au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf (“Following the hearing of testimony and the review of
documents and other evidence, the Tribunal shall determine the status of the subject of the
proceeding in closed session by majority vote. Preponderance of evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this determination.”).
48
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538–39 (2004).
49
See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1089 (2008).
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into account whether greater accuracy-producing procedures are reasonably
available. 50
Note, however, that viewing the problem of proof or certainty
through the lens of warfare takes the legal question of appropriate assessment standards back to the same questions about competing values and policy interests demanded by Mathews v. Eldridge: 51 What are the individual
interests at stake with respect to errors? What are the state interests at stake?
And what steps could the government take—and at what cost or burden—to
reduce errors? 52 This is not to suggest that the preponderance standard being
used by habeas courts is wrong—in fact, when the Department of Defense
established Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantánamo in the wake
of Hamdi and Rasul v. Bush, 53 its applicable guidelines also called for using
the preponderance standard, 54 implying that the executive regards the preponderance standard as the appropriate standard as well. Rather, this analysis suggests the need for more reasoned consideration of proof standards in
this context given the unique problems, stakes, and risks associated with
decision-making.
Moreover, the balancing of these competing risks through procedural regulation cannot be divorced completely from important substantive
legal issues, such as the scope of the executive’s detention power. As John
Jeffries and Paul Stephan have observed in the criminal law context:
Winship’s insistence on the reasonable-doubt standard is thought to express a preference for letting the guilty go free rather than risking conviction of the innocent. This value choice, however, cannot be implemented
by a purely procedural concern with burden of proof. . . . A normative
principle for protecting the “innocent” must take into account not only the
certainty with which facts are established but also the selection of facts to
be proved. A constitutional policy to minimize the risk of convicting the
“innocent” must be grounded in a constitutional conception of what may
constitute “guilt.” Otherwise “guilt” would have to be proved with certain-

50

See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1402–20.
494 U.S. 319, 335 (1979).
52
See supra notes 25–27.
53
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
54
See Memorandum of Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Navy at
3 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.
pdf. Deputy Secretary of the Navy Gordon England explained the standard a bit differently in
announcing the establishment of the CSRT process: “[W]e’ll look at all the data dealing with
their classification as an enemy combatant; . . . [a]nd the standard . . . will be reasonableness.
It will be what would a reasonable person conclude.” See Gordon England, Sec’y of the
Navy, Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) (July 9, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2777.
51
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ty, but the legislature could define “guilt” as it pleased, and the grand ideal
of individual liberty would be reduced to an empty promise. 55

In other words, the extent to which a proof standard prevents “errors” depends in part on how the factual predicate to be proven is defined—in this
case, what does it mean to be an enemy fighter subject to the executive’s
wartime detention authority? A very broadly defined substantive authority
even coupled with a strict proof standard may be no better at accurately
culling true threats than a tightly drawn authority coupled with a loose proof
standard. Thinking through the standard of proof question carefully can
therefore help both to devise substantive detention law and prevent its circumvention.
III. EVIDENTIARY SCRUTINY ISSUES
The standard of proof issue is, of course, linked inextricably to
questions about quality of evidence: on what types of information should a
court base its assessment in reviewing executive detention? It is not the intention of this article to delve deeply into the many specific evidence law
issues that are likely to arise in Guantánamo habeas cases, but rather to
draw observations about the way courts have approached the issue generally. Again, sufficiency or quality of evidence issues can be viewed through
multiple lenses: evidence versus intelligence, and courtroom versus battlefield. And again, lurking beneath these seemingly routine court rulings
about evidence standards are major substantive and institutional questions
about the nature of the conflict with al-Qaida and courts’ proper role in
regulating it.
The executive originally took the position in detainee litigation that
the designation of an individual as an enemy fighter is a judgment that
courts should not second-guess. In its brief to the Supreme Court in Hamdi,
the government argued that “[a] commander’s wartime determination that
an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment,
representing a core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority.” 56 It
argued from a functional standpoint that courts should not second-guess
assessments of disputed facts because, “[e]specially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations and intelligence-gathering has an
unmatched vantage point from which to learn about the enemy and make
judgments as to whether those seized during a conflict are friend or foe.” 57
And from a constitutional separation of powers standpoint, the government
55
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1347 (1979).
56
Brief for the Respondents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004 WL 724020, at *25.
57
Id.
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argued that courts should avoid “embroiling [themselves] in a factual dispute about a battlefield capture halfway around the world.” 58 Anticipating
the response that many detainees at Guantánamo were not captured amid
battle in a combat zone, the government further argued that “[t]he unconventional nature of the current armed conflict only makes such deference
more appropriate” because “[t]he enemy in the current conflict purposely
blurs the lines between combatants and non-combatants by refusing to wear
a uniform or distinctive insignia and attempting to blend into the civilian
population.” 59 The government made similar arguments in its Supreme
Court brief in Rasul v. Bush: “The ‘enemy’ status of aliens captured and
detained during war is a quintessential political question on which the courts
respect the actions of the political branches.” 60 The government further argued that “courts have . . . no judicially-manageable standards[] to evaluate
or second-guess the conduct of the President and the military” on such
matters. 61
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the executive’s argument that assessments of who is or is not an enemy fighter in an ongoing war lie outside
the sphere of judicial competence and authority. In her plurality opinion in
Hamdi, Justice O’Connor emphasizes: “In so holding, we necessarily reject
the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a
heavily circumscribed role for courts in such circumstances,” and that
“courts must forgo any examination of the individual case.” 62 In Boumediene, the Court further explained that:
Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being
tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. . . . Habeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial . . . .
But the writ must be effective. The habeas court must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and
the Executive’s power to detain. 63

The Court went on to say that:
For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as an effective
and proper remedy in this context, the court that conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to correct errors that occurred during the
[Combatant Status Review Tribunal] proceedings. This includes some au-

58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at *27.
Id. at *31.
Brief for the Respondents, Rasul v. Bush, 2004 WL 425739, at *35.
Id. at *37 n.19.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004).
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269 (2008).
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thority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence against the
detainee. 64

What these Supreme Court holdings do not explain, however, is
how habeas courts should assess the sufficiency of information relied upon
by the executive in its decisions. Boumediene calls for “meaningful” review
of the executive’s assessment and for “some” authority to consider the sufficiency of the government’s information. But Boumediene provides very
little guidance as to the rigor with which courts should independently scrutinize that information or the specific rules and standards by which information should be considered or rejected. 65
Against that backdrop, some district courts have adopted fairly aggressive interpretations of their evidentiary gatekeeping role—i.e., what
kind of information comes in during hearings—and of their fact-finding role
in appraising it. 66 Recall from above, for example, the district court’s statement in Boumediene that “the information in the classified intelligence report, relating to the credibility and reliability of the source, was undoubtedly
sufficient for the intelligence purposes for which it was prepared”—but that
it was not adequate to satisfy the government’s burden in court. 67 In Ali
Ahmed v. Obama, the government sought to rely on a “mosaic theory” to
prove petitioner’s conduct in support of al-Qaida: “The Government argues
. . . that ‘the evidence meshes together to demonstrate’ that the Petitioner
engaged in conduct that allows the executive to detain him.” 68 In rejecting
its application to the case at hand, however, the court explained:
The Court understands from the Government’s declarations, and from case
law, that use of the mosaic approach is a common and well-established
mode of analysis in the intelligence community. This may well be true.
Nonetheless, at this point in this long, drawn-out litigation the Court’s obligation is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which satisfy
appropriate and relevant legal standards as to whether the Government has
64

Id. at 2270.
Nor, for that matter, does it answer such basic questions as whether the court should
review whether the executive had sufficient basis to detain at some previous time versus
whether it has such evidence at the time of review.
66
See Al Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at
*3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2009) (“One of the central functions of the Court in this case is ‘to evaluate the raw evidence’ proffered by the Government and to determine whether it is ‘sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition
with the requisite degree of clarity.’”)(internal citations omitted) See also Parhat v. Gates,
532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding inadequate the Government’s evidentiary basis for
CSRT decisions).
67
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
68
Ali Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2009).
65
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proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is justifiably
detained. 69

The district court went on to state: “The kind and amount of evidence which
satisfies the intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the
value of information it obtains may be very different, and certainly cannot
govern the Court’s ruling.” 70
It is difficult to generalize much from these few district court snippets in part because they can be read in several ways. Are the courts saying
that the specific evidentiary submissions by the government in those particular cases were, once scrutinized in court, shown to be too unreliable? Or
are they saying that the types of information relied on by the government to
form its assessments of who is or is not an enemy fighter are unsuitable
generally as proof in court reviews of detention? And if the latter, are the
courts saying that, while recognizing the legal appropriateness of reliance
on intelligence information to support detention in far away combat zones,
they are unwilling to give a judicial imprimatur to similar reliance once a
case reaches a courtroom? Or, going much further, are they saying that the
law of war—even outside the reach of courts—demands the type and quality of evidence that would satisfy a court? The courts’ posture with respect to
evidentiary sufficiency lies ambiguously amid this spectrum.
Moreover, these statements by habeas courts rejecting the sufficiency of some government submissions raise important distinctions between
“evidence” and “intelligence.” Seen through the lens of the courtroom, a
natural analytic starting point for assessing an individual’s enemy status is
evidence, or facts that are “furnished to a legal tribunal otherwise than by
reasoning . . . .” 71 Seen, however, through the lens of a global “battlefield,”
a natural starting point is intelligence—informational assessments and edu-

69

Id. at 56 (footnote omitted).
Id. See also Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (“The
kind and amount of evidence which satisfies the intelligence community in reaching final
conclusions about the value of information it obtains may be very different from, and certainly cannot determine, this Court’s ruling.”).
71
See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §1, at 11 (1983);
see also Bostan v. Obama, No. 05-883, slip op. at 10 n.5 (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2009), available
at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2005cv2386-1408 (applying Federal Rules of Evidence to Guantánamo habeas cases, “except where national security concerns
or undue burden to the government requires otherwise.”). See also id. at 6–7 (“The very
notion that the Court should lower its standards of admissibility to whatever level the government is prepared (or even able) to satisfy is contradictory to the fundamental principles of
fairness that inform the Great Writ’s existence.”).
70
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cated judgments that the executive relies on in making tactical and operational decisions. 72
Evidence assessment and intelligence assessment are similar but not
identical processes, in part because their purposes differ. Both seek truth,
though in the case of evidence in the American justice system it is taken as
an article of faith that adversarial contestation will generally enhance it,73
whereas intelligence collection and assessment is often a unilateral endeavor
relying on interpretation and reasoned assessment amid uncertainties to
guide government actions, and is often conducted and recorded with little
regard for eventual courtroom use. 74 Moreover, the law of evidence serves
not only to promote accuracy but also to protect justice and fairness; 75 intelligence, by contrast, is generally unconcerned with balancing competing
values. 76
Lest one think these are merely semantic or inconsequential distinctions, consider that beyond Guantánamo it is sometimes those same “intelligence purposes” viewed skeptically by the courts upon which the executive
relies in making decisions of enormous military and humanitarian or liberty
consequences. These include detention decisions in Afghanistan, where
recently revised Department of Defense guidelines establish military review
panels applying a preponderance of evidence standard to all reasonably
72

See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 208 (2001 as amended through Aug. 2009); CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO INTELLIGENCE at vii (1999).
73
See Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form and Function: The Search for Truth and
the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 185, 188–89. See also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L.REV
1267, 1283 (citing Wigmore and stating that cross-examination “is beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”).
74
See Wilber, supra note 2 (reporting controversy over whether government’s Guantánamo habeas cases are flimsy or involve evidence “collected on chaotic battlefields for intelligence purposes, not for a courtroom.”). As the Wall Street Journal editorial page put it,
“[T]he truth is that in the fog of battle it is impossible to gather evidence the way a Manhattan cop can. There’s no ‘CSI: Kandahar.’” Editorial, The Enemy Detainee Mess, WALL ST.
J., July 3, 2008, at A10.
75
See FED. R. EVID. 102 (stating “These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”).
76
This paper does not deal with the many complex issues surrounding classified evidence
in detention hearings, and the special problems that come with trying to declassify information or provide suspects or counsel with adequate substitutes. See, e.g., Attorney General
Michael B. Mukasey, Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/
2008/index.html. For a general discussion of these issues in the criminal context, see SERRIN
TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, THE SECRECY PROBLEM
IN TERRORISM TRIALS (2005).
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available information. 77 They also include the application of lethal force,
both in the heat of battle as well as from afar using, for example, aerial
drones against suspected al-Qaida figures. 78 According to one report, in
2008 the U.S. government ratcheted up drone attacks on al-Qaida affiliated
militants in Pakistan in part by lowering the standards that govern targeting:
“We got down to a sort of ‘reasonable man’ standard . . . . If it seemed reasonable, you could hit it.” 79
Besides raising important questions about the appropriate standards
of proof, the statements quoted above from district courts reflect an attitude
that judicial scrutiny of information or evidence is a fundamentally different
exercise than the type of military decision-making that, beyond Guantánamo, currently remains outside the reach of judicial review. If so, this suggests that the application of judicial review to Guantánamo cases has not
merely added a layer of procedural rigor, but in doing so has altered the
analytic processes being applied to available information.
One example of this tension between evidence and intelligence
standards is the case of Al Mutairi v. United States, described above. The
district court credited the government’s evidence that petitioner’s travel
route into Afghanistan matched that used by an al-Qaida affiliated group to
smuggle individuals into Afghanistan to wage jihad; that his travel within
Afghanistan coincided with that of fleeing al-Qaida fighters; and that some
facts about his passport were consistent with an individual who has undergone al-Qaida training. 80 The district court also found that Al Mutairi’s own
story lacked credibility. 81 But the district court was unsatisfied with the
government’s case because it could not prove that petitioner did, in fact,
train with al-Qaida or allied groups, or where he did so: “the Government
77
See Department of Defense, Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment
Facility (BTIF), Afghanistan (U), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2009/09/addendum.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
78
See Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Drone War, NEW REPUBLIC, June 3,
2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-drone-war; Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, 42–45 (detailing use of missile strikes against suspected terrorists amid imperfect intelligence, and resulting errors); Josh Meyer, CIA Expands Use of
Drones in Terror War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1 (“In February 2002, a Predator
tracked and killed a tall man in flowing robes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The
CIA believed it was firing at Bin Laden, but the victim turned out to be someone else.”). On
legal issues of targeted killings, see Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May 11, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0511_
counterrorism_anderson.aspx.
79
See DAVID E. SANGER, THE INHERITANCE: THE WORLD OBAMA CONFRONTS AND THE
CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN POWER 250 (2009).
80
Al Mutairi v. United States, Civil Action No. 02-828 (CKK), 2009 WL 2364173, at *14
(D.D.C. July 29, 2009).
81
Id.
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has not filled in these blanks . . . with sufficiently credible and reliable evidence to meet its burden . . . .” 82 It may well be that under these facts the
government ought not to be able to detain someone, either as a matter of law
or policy. But it also seems quite likely that a reasonable intelligence officer
might assess this case very differently, especially operating from a baseline
expectation that some “blanks” are to be expected in many cases and require
informed but speculative judgment to fill them. 83
To say that the information and analytic processes relied upon by
the executive in performing its military functions are unsuitable in court
would go beyond merely rejecting the executive’s assertion in the 2004 Supreme Court litigation that military tactical decisions—including whom to
capture—are beyond the reach and competency of courts. Courts could have
answered that claim, for example, by insisting on a role for judicial review
of detention but then inquiring deferentially whether the government’s own
analytic assessment was reasonable. 84 That is essentially what the Israeli
Supreme Court did in its 2006 decision upholding but limiting the executive’s authority for “targeted killings” of terrorist leaders—another controversial security measure that relies critically on intelligence information,
sometimes amid clouds of uncertainty:
[A military strike targeting suspected terrorists] is the responsibility of the
executive branch. It has the professional-security expertise to make that
decision. The Court will ask itself if a reasonable military commander
could have made the decision which was made. The question is whether
the decision of the military commander falls within the zone of reasonable
activity on the part of the commander. If the answer is yes, the Court will
not exchange the military commander’s security discretion with the security discretion of the Court. 85

82

Id.
In this regard, circumstantial evidence is one criminal law context in which there is less
distinction between evidence and intelligence analysis.
84
See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV.
1361 (2009). See also Fallon and Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2095 (“[A] court exercising
habeas jurisdiction immediately confronts a ‘scope of review’ question: it could, for example, make an independent determination with no deference to the prior executive judgment,
exercise review but exhibit some deference, or defer completely by withholding review of
the issue altogether.”).
85
Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr., HCJ 769/02, at ¶ 57 (Dec. 14,
2006), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf
(citing Aga v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip Area, HCJ 1005/89, 44(1)
PD 536, 539; Ajuri v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, HCJ
7015/02, 56(6) PD 352, 375). See also Amos N. Guiora, License to Kill, FOREIGN POL’Y
(July 13, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/13/licence_to_kill (stating
“[t]he basis for the attack is intelligence information that meets a four part test: Is it reliable,
83
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One might immediately object that targeted killing is a very different application of coercive state power than detention. Of course it is. 86 But
the ways in which it is different and the manner in which those distinctions
ought to influence the institutional decision-making balance among the
branches of government are complex questions left open by Boumediene,
and only their surface is being scratched in Guantánamo habeas cases. 87
IV. LOOKING FORWARD
At the time of this writing, it remains unclear which branch or
branches of government will resolve these questions of proof and evidence
standards for future detention decisions, let alone where to set that
line. 88 However, this brief examination of some of the few district court
cases that have dealt with the issue yields several insights or questions that
should guide further legal development as the U.S. government contemplates a post-Guantánamo future.
First, embedded in the seemingly simple exercises of setting a standard of proof and sufficiency of evidence standard for judicial review of
detention decisions are fundamental choices about balancing risks (erronecredible, valid and viable? Given the stakes, corroborated information is significantly preferable to information that comes from a single source.”).
86
See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1402–29.
87
To the extent that one looks to other federal habeas or appellate contexts by analogy,
there are several different frames through which to consider appropriate judicial posture.
One might, for example, look to rigorous federal habeas evidentiary hearings in cases where
the prior state fact-finding or evidentiary hearing is considered inadequate. See Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312–18 (1963); HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 17, at § 20.3(d)–(f). On
the other hand, one might analogize Guantánamo-type detention habeas cases to federal
appellate review of probable cause determinations by police, or other such context-sensitive
discretionary decision-making. In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), the Court
held that:
[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause
should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out
that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.
Id. at 699. The Court reasoned that “a police officer views the facts through the lens of his
police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical
facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference.” Id.
88
President Obama pledged to work with Congress in fashioning a post-Guantánamo legal
framework that includes a strong role for courts. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by
the President on National Security at the National Archive (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-NationalSecurity-5-21-09/. Since then, however, the White House has signaled that it will not seek
legislation to regulate detention of Guantánamo detainees. See Peter Finn, Administration
Won’t Seek New Detention System, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2009, at A10; Anne E. Kornblut &
Dafna Linzer, White House Regroups on Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009.
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ous long-term deprivation of liberty versus letting a terrorist go free), distributing those risks between captured individuals and society threatened by
terrorism, and relying on judicial scrutiny versus deference to military or
executive decision-making. 89 The law of war vests considerable discretion
in military commanders because judgments balancing humanitarian harms
and military necessity are so context-dependent, often involving tremendous
potential risks in either direction. Procedural due process doctrine only rarely confronts similarly dire consequences of both false positives and false
negatives, and even more rarely without statutory guidance or some other
constitutional or common law principles about how to balance those risks.
Second, if the hypothesis of Part III is correct—that in assessing the
sufficiency of the government’s case courts are subtly transforming not just
the procedures of review but the nature of the factual evaluation—then the
current gulf between legal regulation of detention at Guantánamo and elsewhere is wider than may be supposed. The standards of proof and evidence
relied on by the executive outside of Guantánamo to detain under the same
wartime legal authorities may be lower than those being applied to Guantánamo or may involve very different types of information and analytic
processes. 90 Such disparities could not only inadvertently skew incentives
regarding where the executive will hold detainees but would raise considerably the stakes of ongoing litigation about whether habeas rights extend to
detainees held in Afghanistan. 91
Given the significant and long-term public policy import of the underlying risk calibration questions, Congress ought to play a significant role
89

See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2069 (“Modern notions of deference to administrative decisionmakers, developed primarily in other contexts, are in considerable tension
with the historic office of the Great Writ.”).
90
On the application of the law of war to U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan, see
Matthew C. Waxman, United States Detention Operations in Afghanistan and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 39 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 161 (2009).
91
To date, there has been limited litigation dealing with this issue; only one court has
squarely addressed the question of habeas rights for Bagram detainees. See Maqaleh v.
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). In that case, Judge Bates held that three out of
four detainees before him were entitled to habeas protection; the fourth could not invoke the
Suspension Clause due to his Afghan citizenship. Id. at 209. There was, however, no discussion as to the standards of proof or evidence being applied in that case, as the court did not
reach the merits of the habeas petitions. Rather, the court decided the as applied constitutionality of a statute amending federal habeas jurisdiction, and even this limited holding was
stayed several months later in the face of a government motion to stay the decision pending
appeal. See Maqaleh v. Gates, Civil Action No. 06-1669, slip op. at 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. June 1,
2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/bagramorder-6-1-09.pdf. See also Warren Richey, Next Flash Point over Terror Detainees: Bagram
Prison, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2009/0212/p01s01-usmi.html; Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds
Detainee Policy in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22bagram.html.
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in helping to resolve them. 92 Until now, these issues have largely been
worked out through a back and forth struggle between the executive and the
courts. In the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, Congress touched on the proof
standard issue obliquely in mandating that federal court review of Guantánamo detentions would be limited to:
(i) [W]hether the status determination of the Combatant Status Review
Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with the standards and
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (including the requirement that the conclusion of the
Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence and allowing a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence); and 93 (ii)
to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are applicable,
whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. 94

But at that time Congress and the executive were trying to restrict
judicial reconsideration of the underlying factual claims, and the rest of the
statute gave the executive wide latitude to determine appropriate informational assessment standards and processes. 95 Besides the fact that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal process was held to be an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus in Boumediene, several major factors argue in favor
of thoroughly re-examining previous policy assumptions. Those factors
include better knowledge about the detainee population at Guantánamo and
elsewhere, the evolving nature of the transnational terrorism threat, the capacity of the government to make “accurate” determinations of dangerousness, and the development or enhancement of other government counterterrorism tools and legal authorities to combat threats. Congress ought
therefore consider whether innovative approaches to the standard of proof
and evidence questions—beyond both the usual habeas approach and the
usual law of war approach—might best balance competing interests. For
example, legislation regulating detention might escalate the required standard of proof in periodic review by a court, beginning with a relatively low
92
See Benjamin Wittes & Jack Goldsmith, Will Obama Follow Bush or FDR?, WASH.
POST, June 29, 2009, at A17 (discussing and criticizing both a unilateral executive approach
and the lengthy legislative approach to dealing with terrorist detainees); David A. Martin,
Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 125 (Winter 2005) (proposing a system with limited habeas review in which courts would defer to military factfinding but would
retain authority to consider validity of tribunal procedures and the substantive standards
governing “enemy combatant" classifications).
93
See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1408–12.
94
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742.
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See Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in the War on Terrorism, 2 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 259, 260–67 (2006); Fallon & Meltzer, supra, note 18, at 2060.
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standard to justify short-term detention but a much more rigorous standard
beyond a certain duration. 96
Analysis of the Guantánamo habeas cases shows that seemingly
straightforward issues of proof and evidentiary standards depend heavily on
the appropriate baseline: war versus peacetime, military discretion based on
intelligence versus law enforcement discretion based on evidence. In 2004,
when the Supreme Court decided Hamdi, courts generally seemed to favor
the former. By 2009, there has been a largely unspoken drift by courts toward the latter. Ultimately, effective institutional reform will require viewing the problem from a perspective that combines features of courtroom
justice and battlefield combat, evidentiary scrutiny and intelligence analysis.
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See Waxman, supra note 5, at 1408–12.

